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Modjeska: Recognition Picketing Under the NLRA

RECOGNITION PICKETING UNDER THE NLRA
LEE MODJESKA*
INTRODUCTION

Long ago, Justice Holmes articulated the broad socioeconomic considerations underlying national labor policy:
[O]ne of the eternal confficts out of which life is made up is that between
the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that
of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for
the least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and
powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.,
Peaceful picketing is a potent union weapon in this battle.2 To protect labor's
right to use this weapon for organization or recognition while checking potential abuses inherent in its unrestrained exercise,3 Congress amended the
National Labor Relations Act 4 in 1959. The amendment, section 8(b)(7),6
provides "a comprehensive code governing organizational strikes and picketing .

. . ."I

Congress enacted this section to ensure employees freedom of

choice in selecting a bargaining representative."
*Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. A.B. 1955, Antioch College;
LL.B. 1960, University of Wisconsin.
In 1959, the year section 8(b)(7) was enacted, the late Professor-Emeritus Nathan P.
Feinsinger of Wisconsin Law School brilliantly led this author and his classmates through
the undeveloped maze of the section. It is with respect and affection that this article is
therefore dedicated in memory of Nate.
1. Vegalahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. "The ultimate source of bargaining power is the ability to inflict economic damage
on the opponent. Thus the ground rules regulating the use of economic pressure have always
been a hotly disputed area of labor law." L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMIcs AND LABOR RELATIONS 583 (7th ed. 1978).
3. International Hod Carriers, Local 840 (C.A. Blinne Constr. Co.) 185 N.L.R.B. 1153,
1158 (1962).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-182, 185-187 (1976).
5. 29 US.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976).
6. NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 US. 274, 291 (1960). See also NLRB v. Local 103,
Iron Workers (Higdon Constr. Co.), 434 U.S. 335 (1978). See generally Cox, The LandrumGriffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959);
Dunau, Some Aspects of the Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(7), 52 GRo. L.J. 220
(1964); Meltzer, OrganizationalPicketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L. REv.
78 (1962); Rosen, Area Standards Picketing, 23 LAB. L.J. 67 (1972); Shawe, FederalRegulation
of Recognition Picketing, 52 GEo. L.J. 248 (1964); Note, Picketing for Area Standards: An
Exception to Section 8(b)(7), 1968 Dus. L.J. 767.
7. See NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers (Higdon Constr. Co.), 434 U.S. 335, 346 (1978).
The use of picketing was of particular concern as a method of coercion in three specific
contexts: where employees had already selected another union representative, where
employees had recently voted against a labor union, and where employees had not
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From its inception, section 8(b)(7) has raised difficult problems of interpretation and harmonization.8 It continues to be one of the most intricate and
opaque strands in the web of national labor policy. To unravel some of these
intricacies, this article will trace the section's evolution, reviewing its construction and application by the courts and the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board). Board procedures for resolving alleged violations of the
section will also be examined. The current state of the law pertaining to
organizational picketing will be analyzed, and problem areas in application
of the section identified.
EXPLICATION OF THE STATUTE

Section 8(b)(7) 9 bars a union from picketing for recognition or organization
been given a chance to vote on the question of representation. Picketing in these
circumstances was thought impermissibly to interfere with the employees' freedom of
choice.
Id. at 347. See also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975), in which the court stated:
One of the major aims of the 1959 Act was to limit "top-down" organizing campaigns,
in which unions used economic weapons to force recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of his employees. Congress accomplished this goal by enacting
§ 8(b)(7), which restricts primary recognitional picketing, and by further tightening
§ 8(b)(4)(B), which prohibits the use of most secondary tactics in organizational
campaigns.
Id. at 632.
8. See, e.g., International Hod Carriers, Local 840
N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). The statute provides:

(C.A. Blinne Constr. Co.), 135

(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing
or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization
as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is
currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this subchapter
any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 159(c) of this title,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 159(c)
of this title has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 159(c)
of this title being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days
from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when such a petition has
been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section
159(c)(1) of this title or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part
of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be
appropriate and shall certify tfhe results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in
this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization,
unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other
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in certain circumstances. Subsection (A) bans organizational or recognitional
picketing when the employer has lawfully recognized another union and
questions concerning representation cannot appropriately be raised. 10 Subsection (B) bars such picketing when a valid Board election has been held
within the preceding twelve months. 1 Subsection (G) provides that when
picketing for recognition or organization is not barred by subsections (A) or
(B), such picketing may not exceed thirty days unless a representation petition

is filed within that period. 2
If no such petition is filed, picketing beyond thirty days is an unfair labor
practice. Filing a timely petition stays the limitation and the picketing may
continue pending the outcome of the petition. The first proviso to subsection
(C) expedites the procedure. It requires a Board directed and certified election
once a timely petition has been filed.' 3 The second proviso to subsection (C)
affords an immunity to certain kinds of informational picketing when subsections (A) and (B) do not apply. This immunity is withheld when the object
of the informational picketing is to interfere with deliveries to the picketed
1
employer.
The "comprehensive code" contained in section 8(b)(7) is designed to
further the orderly resolution of disputes over representation of employees by
requiring settlement through Board procedures rather than coercive picketing.1
The Board's Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure implement
the section.' 6 A case is given priority status and promptly investigated" upon
the filing of a charge that a union has violated section 8(b)(7). If after investigation the charge appears to have merit, the Regional Director issues a
complaint and simultaneously applies to the federal district court for an injunction against the picketing. 8 However, when a union that has filed a
person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods
or not to perform any services. Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to
permit any act which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this subsection.

10. Id. § 158(b)(7)(A).
11. Id. § 158(b)(7)(B).
12. Id. § 158(b)(7)(C).
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. As one court remarked:
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments indicate a further drift by Congress from the

Norris-LaGuardia view that the law has no useful role to play in labor disputes,
toward a view that there is a need for greater stability in the organizational recog-

nitional areas of industrial relations... [Section 8(b)(7)] seeks to accomplish this objective.
Penello v. Retail Store Employees, Local 692, 188 F. Supp. 192 (D.C. Md. 1960), ajfd, 287
F.2d 50) (4th Cir. 1961).
16. NLRB Rules & Regs., 29 C.F.R. § 102 (1982); NLRB Statements of Procedure, 29
C.F.R. § 101 (1982).
17. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.22, 102.73, .95(a)(19) (1982).
18. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.22(b), 102.74 (1982). Section 10(1) provides for injunctive relief
pending final Board decision regarding certain unfair labor practice conduct, including that
arising under section 8(b)(7). 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). See also McLeod v. Chefs, Local 89,
280 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1960).
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"timely" election petition is charged with violating subsection (C), the Regional
Director suspends proceedings on the unfair labor practice charge and investigates the petition.19 If the Regional Director decides an election is
warranted and no issues require a prior hearing, he will direct an election to be
held in an appropriate unit of employees. 20 Any party aggrieved by the
Regional Director's direction of the election may seek review by filing with the
Board a request for special permission to appeal the Regional Director's
action. The Board may order a stay of the election if appropriate. 21 After the
election, and after disposition of any challenges to election procedures, the
2
Regional Director issues a certification of the election results.2
If the picketing union loses the election but nevertheless continues picketing for recognition or organization, it is subject to restraint under section
8(b)(7)(B) because an election was held within the past twelve months. Accordingly, the employer may file a new unfair labor practice charge alleging
violation of section 8(b)(7)(B). Upon investigating the charge and finding it
meritorious, the Regional Director may issue a complaint and concurrently
seek to enjoin the picketing.23 In the subsequent section 8(b)(7)(B) proceeding,
the initial question is whether the post-election picketing has the proscribed
object of recognition or organization. With an affirmative finding the inquiry
becomes whether there was a "valid election." In the new proceeding, all
questions relating to the validity of the election, including the Regional Di24
rector's propriety of directing it, are open to Board and judicial review.
ProscribedMeans: Picketing
Although section 8(b)(7) prohibits unions from picketing for recognition
or organization, the Act fails to define picketing. Moreover, few decisions 25
since the section's enactment have interpreted the term. Essentially, picketing
is a patrol that "establishes a locus in quo that has far more potential for
inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey.
...
20
Picketing generally involves the use of signs combined with the elements of
19. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.22(a), 102.75(a) (1982).
20. Id. §§ 101.23(b), 102.77(b). However, where the Regional Director determines that
any of the issues involved raise questions which should be decided by the Board before
election, he may order a hearing on such issues and then submit the matter to the Board
for determination. Id.
21. Id. §§ 101.23(b), 102.80(c).
22. Id. §§ 101.23(b), 102.78, .69(b). The Regional Director dismisses the unfair labor
practice charge when he determines an election should be held on the petition, the processing of which has been "suspended" pending investigation of the petition. Id. §§ 101.24(a),
102.81(a). See Department & Specialty Store Employees Union, Local 1265 v. Brown, 284 F.2d
619 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 934 (1961).
23. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.22(b), 102.74 (1982).
24. See Department & Specialty Store Employees Union, Local 1265 v. Brown, 284 F.2d
619 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 934 (1961); Department of Specialty Store Employees Union, Local 1265 (Kinney Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 335 (1962).
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Local 182, Teamsters (Woodward Motors), 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 282, Teamsters,
262 N.L.R.B. 528 (1982); Teamsters, Local 688, 205 N.L.R.B. 1131 (1973).
26. Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950).
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patrolling and confrontation. Yet courts have established union conduct as
picketing despite the lack of signs27 or of conventional patrolling.2
In NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters (Woodward Motors),2 union members
placed signs in snowbanks and then waited in nearby cars until delivery trucks
approached. The Board determined that these actions constituted picketing
prohibited by section 8(b)(7).30 In the action for enforcement of the Board's
order, the1 Second Circuit consulted a dictionary for the labor meaning of
"picket." The court found picketing to be walking or standing in front of a
place of employment; movement by pickets was not necessary. 2 Holding the
union's conduct violated section 8(b)(7), the court stated: "The activity was
none the less picketing because the union chose to bisect it, placing the
material elements in snowbanks but protecting the human elements from the
rigors of an upstate New York winter by giving them the comfort of heated
cars until a delivery truck approached .... .,33
The following year, the same court found it necessary to clarify its decision.
In NLRB v. United Furniture Workers,34 union representatives attached signs
to poles and trees every morning in front of the employer's plant, then waited
in a car across the street until the afternoon when they removed the signs. The
Board found the activity constituted picketing.- The court returned the case
to the Board for additional findings of fact, stating that the facts did not show
whether confrontation, an essential element of picketing, had taken place. 36
The court's test was whether the union members' presence in the car was intended to and did have the same effect on people approaching the plant as if
the members had stayed with the signs.2 7 For example, if union representatives
had stayed in a house across the street, that conduct is not "picketing." 38
These two decisions show that picketing may occur with posted but unaccompanied signs. Later decisions 9 demonstrate that patrolling without signs
may constitute picketing. In Teamsters, Local 688, 40 the union passed out
leaflets to persons entering the employer's premises. 41 The Board distinguished
picketing from handbilling in the following manner:
27. See, e.g., Local 282, Teamsters, 262 N.L.R.B. 528 (1982); District 30, U.M.W., 163
N.L.R.B. 562 (1967).
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570, 169 N.L.R.B. 279, enforced. 402 F.2d 452 (10th Cir.
1968).
29. 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963).
30. 135 N.L.R.B. 851, 851 (1962).
31. 314 F.2d at 57-58. See also W.BSrER's Nav

INTERNATIONAL

DICIONARY (2d ed.).

32. 314 F.2d at 58.
33. Id.

34. 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964).
35. 146 N.L.R.B. 474,474 (1964).
36. 337 F.2d at 940.
37. Id.
38.

Id.

39. Local 282, Teamsters, 262 N.L.R.B. 528 (1982); Teamsters, Local 688, 205 N.L.R.B.

1131, 1133 (1973).
40. 205 N.L.R.B. 1131 (1973).
41. Id. at 1131-32. Although the union varied the form of the handbills, all leaflets
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We recognize, of course, that there may be situations where, even though
union agents do not patrol with signs, their very presence is intended to
and does operate as a signal to induce action by those to whom the signal
is given. It is this "signalling" which provokes responses without inquiry into the ideas disseminated and distinguishes picketing from
other forms of communication and makes it subject to restrictive regulation.42

The Board recently affirmed a similar decision by an administrative law
judge in Local 282, Teamsters.43 In that case union members stationed at the

44
employer's delivery entrances neither carried signs nor handed out leaflets.

The administrative law judge held the activity to be picketing because the
4
union members conveyed a signal to delivery truck drivers to halt deliveries. 5
4
The Board agreed with his findings. "

ProscribedObjects: Organizationand Recognition
Section 8(b)(7) proscribes picketing when "an object" of the picketing is to
force an employer "to recognize or bargain with a labor organization," or to
force employees to select the union as their bargaining representative. 47 The
section prohibits picketing only when one of the objects is organization or
recognition. Because section 8(b)(7) uses the phrase "an object," so long as
one of the union's objectives is illegal the existence of other legitimate objectives
is immaterial.48 Conversely, picketing conducted solely to protest an employee's
discharge and secure his reinstatement is not illegal. 49 When an employer alleges
an 8(b)(7) violation, the Board must first ascertain whether the union's conduct
constitutes picketing. If so, the Board must then determine the object of the
picketing. 50
Picketing solely for the purpose of protesting substandard wages and
suggested that representation by the union would benefit the employees. The handbills were
initially directed toward employees, but later were aimed at the public. Id. at 1132.
42. Id. at 1133. However, the Board found that the union was not seeking to convey a
signal by distributing its handbills. Id.
43. 262 N.L.R.B. 528 (1982).
44. Id. at 528-29.
45. Id. at 541. See also Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local 2797, 156 N.L.R.B. 388, 394
(1965):
The important feature of picketing appears to be the posting by a labor organization
or by strikers of individuals at the approach to a place of business to accomplish a
purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping employees away from
work or keeping customers away from the employer's business.
46. 262 N.L.R.B. at 529.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976).
48. See NLRB v. Local 265 (RP & M Elec.), 604 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1979). See also
IBEW, Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 700 (1951); Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1951).
49. See Local 259, UAW (Fanelli Ford Sales, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1468, 1475 (1961).
50. As the Supreme Court remarked, "[d]etermining the object, or objects, of labor union
picketing is a recurring and necessary function of the Board. Its resolution of these mixed
factual and legal questions normally survives judicial review." NLRB v. Local 103, Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 342 n.7 (1978).
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achieving area wage standards does not violate section 8(b)(7) 53 because the
picketing's object is not for recognition or organization. Determining whether
picketing is directed only to area standards is often problematic. 2 The Board
considers various factors to determine whether a union is engaged in permissible area standards picketing or is using area standards as a pretext for
recognition. For example, the Board examines whether the union actually
investigated the employer's wages and benefits,53 or whether there were "adequate, reasonably reliable, external sources to substantiate the union's conclusion" that the employer's economic package was substandard.5 4 The Board
also considers whether the union requested the employer to furnish information irrelevant to area standards.- Another factor in the Board's determination
is whether the union's demands of the employer were broader than necessary
for compliance with area standards56
The Board has recognized that a union may alter its picketing objectives.
Thus, a union's original recognitional object does not preclude a finding that
later picketing was for the permissible purpose of maintaining area standards. 57
"[W]hen a union follows a disclaimer with the cessation of picketing for a
significant period of time and engages in no other conduct inconsistent with
its disavowal of representative interest, the Board has been more inclined to
conclude that the union has abandoned its present recognitional objective.".5s
51. See Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136
N.L.R.B. 321 (1962).
52. See IBEW, Local 265 (RP 8:M Elec.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1978), enforced, 604 F.2d
1091 (8th Cir. 1979). Member Jenkins at the Board level and Judge Heaney in the enforcement proceeding strongly dissented, finding that the facts were consonant with permissible
area standards picketing. 236 N.L.R.B. 1333, 1335 (1978) (dissenting opinion); 604 F.2d
1091, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1979) (Heaney, J., dissenting). As one administrative law judge

stated:
We must continually bear in mind that recognition and area standards represent
different goals. Unions exist for organizational and recognitional purposes, and
always have an ultimate goal of representing all employees functioning in a particular

industry. They do not lightly forego it, and pursuit of an ostensible area standards
object must not be viewed as an easy way to circumvent the statutory proscriptions
against recognitional picketing. Thus, we must always carefully scrutinize the circumstances surrounding alleged area standards picketing to determine if the union in
pursuing this course of action has accepted the required limitations, and may reasonably be said to be seeking no more than an equalization of competitive advantage
rather than the attainment of a bargaining relationship.
Sales Delivery Drivers, Local 296, 205 N.L.R.B. 462, 469 (1973). See-also IBEW, Local 265
(RP & M Elec.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1333, 1335 n.6 (1978) (purported area standards often used
to disguise prohibited recognitional or organizational aims).
53. See Carpenters, Local 1622, 250 N.L.R.B. 416, 418 (1980); Building Serv. Employees,
Local 87 (Liberty House/Rhodes), 223 N.L.R.B. 30, 34 (1976).
54. General Serv. Employees, Local 73 (A-1 Security Serv. Co.), 224 N.L.R.B. 434, 435
(1976), enforced, 578 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
55. See Automotive Employees, Local 88, 208 N.L.R.B. 679, 680 (1974).
56. See IBEW, Local 265 (R.P & M Elec.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1978), enforced, 604 F.2d
1091 (8th Cir. 1979).
57. See Ventura County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 242 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1979).
58. McClintock Market, Inc. 244 N.L.R.B. 555 (1979). See also Ogden Ent., 248 N.L.R.B.
290 (1980); John's Valley Foods, 237 N.L.R.B. 425 (1978).
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Although picketing for area standards is not a proscribed object, picketing
to enforce a prehire contract may encompass a recognitional object and thus
violate section 8(b)(7). In NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers (Higdon Contracting Co.),59 the Supreme Court upheld the Board's finding that an uncertified,
minority union violated section 8(b)(7)(C) by picketing to enforce a prehire
contract lawful under section 8(f). 0 In Iron Workers, Higdon Construction
Company and Local 103 had been parties to a collective bargaining relationship since 1968. In 1973, Higdon and Local 103 entered into a prehire contract
which obligated Higdon to follow the terms of a tri-state, multiemployer association agreement. The prehire contract contained a union-security agreement. Higdon Contracting Company was then formed for the express purpose
of performing nonunion construction work. Thereafter, Local 103 picketed
two Higdon Contracting projects with signs that read "Higdon Construction
Company is in violation of the agreement of the Iron Workers Local Number
103." '61 Local 103 did not represent a majority of employees at either project
and its members picketed one project for more than thirty days without filing
a representation petition.
The Board found the prehire contract not binding upon the employer
because Local 103 never achieved majority status. 62 In the Board's view, a prehire contract does not give a minority union the rights of a majority union
until it attains majority status in the relevant unit. Until then the prehire
contract is voidable and lacks the binding effect of a majority union contract.
The Board found the picketing was not to enforce an existing agreement, but
rather to force Higdon Contracting to bargain with Local 103. Because the
picketing had a proscribed object and because Local 103 was uncertified and
had failed to file a representation petition within a reasonable time, the Board
found the picketing violative of section 8(b)(7)(C).
The D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order,63 holding that
Local 103 had the right to picket to enforce the lawful prehire contract. The
court found that granting a nonmajority union the contract enforcement rights
of a majority union was permissible because section 8(f) denied contract bar
protections to prehire agreements.
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the Board's decision as being
validly predicated upon the statutory policy favoring majoritarian exclusivity.
The Court stated that section 8(f) is a limited exception to the general statutory
64
prohibition against minority union recognition and minority agreements.

59. 434 U.S. 335 (1978). See also Modjeska, The Supreme Court and the Diversification
of National Labor Policy, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 37 (1979).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). See generally NLRB Guidelines on Construction Pre-Hire
Agreements, 1979 LAB. REL.YEARBOOK 349.

61. 434 U.S. at 340.
62. Local 103, Iron Workers (Higdon Constr. Co.), 216 N.L.R.B. 45 (1975).
63. Local 103, Iron Workers v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
64. 434 U.S. at 345. The Court noted its decision in ILGWU v. NLRB (BernhardAltmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961), in which the Court held an employer violated
§ 8(a)(1) and (2). The Court also found the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by entering into an
exclusive collective bargaining agreement with a minority union. The Bernhard-Altmann
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Section 8(f) legalizes minority agreements in the construction industry but does
not protect the union against inquiry into majority status during the life of
the agreement. 65 The Court endorsed the correlative Board principle that
absent proof of a union's majority status, an employer's refusal to honor a prehire contract is not violative of section 8(a)(5).66
The Court agreed with the Board that section 8(b)(7)(C) should not be
interpreted literally so as to forbid any picketing with a bargaining object.
While section 8(b)(7)(G) does not ban picketing by a majority union to enforce
a contract, it does ban picketing to force initial recognition and bargaining.
By dovetailing these interpretations of sections 8(f) and 8(b)(7)(G), and by
recognizing Local 103's minority status at the picketed projects, the Court
concluded the picketing violated section 8(b)(7)(C).
Rival Union Picketing
Section 8(b)(7)(A) bans picketing for recognition or organization when the
employer has lawfully recognized another union unless the picketing union
can appropriately challenge that representation. 67 The subsection embodies
the congressional judgment that in such situations "both the employer and
the employees are entitled to immunity from recognition or organization
picketing for a proscribed period." 68
Section 8(b)(4)(C)69 of the Taft-Hartley Act protects an employer from
rival union picketing when the employees are represented by a certified union.
Section 8(b)(7)(A)70 extends the protection to situations involving contracts
with uncertified but lawfully recognized unions when no question concerning
representation may appropriately be raised. The subsection thus essentially
reaches the situation where the Board's contract bar (or other bar) rules pre1
dude an election.7
A rival picketing union may challenge the legality of the incumbent

Court stated there could be "no clearer abridgment" of the § 7 rights of employees to select
their own bargaining representative than to grant exclusive bargaining status to an agency
selected by a minority of its employees. 366 U.S. at 737.
65. 434 US. at 845. The Court examined the presumption of continued majority status
accorded to majority union contracts, citing Dayton Motels, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 674, 678 (1971),
remanded, 474 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1973), enforced, 525 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1976). 434 U.S. at 343.
The Court said that the question of a union's majority status is also subject to litigation
in a suit under § 301 of the Act to enforce a § 8(f) contract. "[A]bsent a showing that the
union is the majority's chosen instrument, the contract is unenforceable." Id. The Court
found that this construction of the statute did not render § 8(f) meaningless. Id. at 352.
66. 434 US. at 345. "The employer's duty to bargain and honor the contract is contingent
on the union's attaining majority support at the various construction sites." Id.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A) (1976).
68. International Hod Carriers, Local 840 (CA. Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153,
1156-57 (1962).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (1976).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A), (1976).
71. See Local 378, Meat Cutters (Waldbaum, Inc.), 153 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965); Local
1199, Drug & Hosp. Employees Union (Janel Sales Corp.), 136 N.L.R.B. 1564 (1962); Local
182, Teamsters (Sitrue, Inc.), 129 N.L.R.B. 1459, 1463 (1961).
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union's representative status only when permitted under sections 8 or 9 of the
Act, 72 not as a defense to section 8(b)(7)(A) charges.73 The Board has explained:
Section 8(b)(7)(A), . .. was intended in part to promote stability in
established bargaining relationships, an interest also served both by the
contract bar rules and by Section 10(b). To hold ...that an incumbent
union's representative status may be placed in issue as a defense to
8(b)(7)(A) charges would permit a rival union to accomplish by means
of picketing what it could not achieve under established Board procedures. Such an application of 8(b)(7)(A) would offend the very policy
which that Section was designed to further. Consistent with the congressional scheme, it is our opinion that the term 'lawfully recognized' was
meant to include all bargaining
relationships immune from attack
74
under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.

The informational (or second) proviso of section 8(b)(7)(C) is not available
as a defense to an alleged violation of section 8(b)(7)(A). That proviso applies
only to situations defined in the principal clause of section 8(b)(7)(C). 5 However, a union picketing in the face of a lawful collective bargaining relationship may assert an area standards defense.7 6 Picketing for area wage standards
does not violate 8(b)(7)(A) even though adoption of area standards by the employer would greatly infringe on the incumbent union's collective bargaining
7
agreement with the employer. 7
Post-ElectionPicketing
Section 8(b)(7)(B) bars a rival union from picketing for recognitional or
organizational objects where a valid Board election has been held within the
preceding twelve months.7 8 With this section, Congress intended that "where
the employees within the preceding twelve months have made known their
views concerning representation, both the employer and the employees are
entitled to immunity from recognition or organization picketing for prescribed periods." 79 Accordingly, the initial question in a section 8(b)(7)(B) proceeding is whether the post-election picketing is conducted for the proscribed
purpose of recognition or organization.80 If it is, the inquiry becomes whether
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 159 (1976). For example, the union might challenge the incumbent
union's status under § 8(a)(2), alleging employer domination or interference with the formation of the incumbent union. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
73. See International Hod Carriers, Local 1298 (Roman Stone Constr. Co.), 153 N.L.R.B.
659 (1965).
74. Id. at 659, n.3. See also Sheet Metal Workers, Local 284 (Quality Roofing Co.), 169
N.L.R.B. 1014 (1968); District 9, U.M.W. (Seagraves Coal Co.), 160 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1966).
75. See Local 1199, Drug & Hosp. Employees Union (Janel Sales Corp.), 136 N.L.R.B.
1564 (1962).
76. Sales Delivery Drivers, Local 296, 205 N.L.R.B. 462 (1973).
77. Id. at 469-71.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976).
79. International Hod Carriers, Local 840 (C.A. Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153,
1156-57 (1962). The certification date rather than the ballot date is determinative under
§ 8(b)(7)(B). See Retail Store Employees' Union, Local 692 (Irvins, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 686
(1961).
80. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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a "valid election" was in fact held. All questions regarding the validity of the
election are open to Board and judicial review in the subsequent section
8(b)(7)(B) proceeding"'
UnreasonableDurationand Expedited Election
Section 8(b)(7)(C) provides that when subsections (A) and (B) do not
bar picketing for recognition or organization, such picketing is limited to a
reasonable period. This reasonable period may not exceed thirty days unless a
representation petition is filed within that period.8 2 If no petition is filed,
picketing beyond the reasonable period is an unfair labor practice.83 To avoid
prolonged picketing, the first proviso to subsection (C) expedites the election
procedure specifying that when a timely petition has been filed, "the Board
shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section [9(c)(1)] or the
absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and
84
shall certify the results thereof."
The purpose of section 8(b)(7)(C) is to afford a union a reasonable opportunity to use picketing as an organizational device. Thereafter, the Board
may hold an election to determine whether a majority of the employees want
the union as its representative. Although the section sets thirty days as the
maximum picketing period without filing a representation petition the Board
may fix shorter periods as "reasonable." In assessing whether a shorter period
is reasonable, the Board may consider the particular circumstances,85 such as
pre-Act picketing, violence or perishable goods.8 6 In some instances, the Board
81. NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963); Department & Specialty
Store Employees Union, Local 1265 v. Brown, 284 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
934 (1961); Department & Specialty Store Employees Union, Local 1265 (Kinney Co.), .136
N.L.R.B. 335 (1962).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). See also NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S.
335 (1978).
83. The timely petition requirement is satisfied not only by a petition filed by the
picketing union, but also by a petition filed by a competing union. United Bhd. of Carpenters
(B.H. Brown Constr. Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 740 (1973).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
85. See NLRB v. Local 239, Teamsters, 289 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833
(1961). Thus, Senator Goldwater declared:
[Section 8(b)(7)(C)] simply means this: A union may not picket for recognition or for
organizational purposes for more than a reasonable period which may be less than 30
days if the Boardso determines, but may not be longer, without a petition for a representation election being filed with the Board. If no such petition is filed in such
period then at the end thereof, but not later than the 31st day from its commencement, such picketing, if continued or resumed, becomes an unfair labor practice.
105 CONG. REc. 1972 (1959) (emphasis added).
Similarly, Representative Griffin, cosponsor of the provision and member of the Conference Committee, stated: "Of course, the picketing may be enjoined in less than 30 days
if the Board finds the circumstances are such as to make it unreasonable to permit it to
continue and it must be stopped at the end of 30 days." 105 CONG. REc. 18153 (1959).
86. See, e.g., District 65, Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union, 141 N.L.R.B. 991, 999
(1963) (30 days is outside limitation; in view of threats of physical violence, use of abusive
language, and blocking of struck premises, picketing was unlawful after 26 days).
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has found picketing to be unreasonable ab initio: when the picketing union is
statutorily s 7 disabled from representing the unit. s8
Gases concerning plant guards have clarified the operation of section
8(b)(7)(C) when the picketing union is ineligible for certification as the representative of the picketed employer's employees. Section 9(b)(3) of the Act prohibits the Board from certifying a union as the representative of a unit of
guards if the union admits nonguards to membership.8 9 In Teamsters, Local 71
(Wells FargoArmored Service Corp.),30 the union resumed recognitional picketing after dismissal of its representation petition on the basis of section
9(b)(3) violations. The Board stated that filing a representation petition is a
defense to an unfair labor practice charge only when the petition raises a
valid question concerning representation. Because section 9(b)(3) prohibited
the union's certification, no valid question concerning representation could
have been raised by the union's petition. 9 1 The Board thus held the union's
92
picketing unreasonable and a violation of section 8(b)(7).
General Service Employees Local 73 (A-1 Security Service)93 presented
similar facts, but the union had never filed a representation petition. Because

nonguards were admitted to membership in violation of section 9(b)(3), 94 the
union was ineligible for certification. Thus, any representation petition filed

would have been dismissed. Citing Wells Fargo, the Board held that any picketing by the union, regardless of the duration, would violate section 8(b)(7). 95
Enforcing the Board order, the D.C. Circuit elaborated, "[t]he necessary
consequence of our decision is that only groups eligible to be recognized can

87. The Board has reached opposite results in two situations where a union could
never be certified as bargaining representative. When the picketing union is ineligible for
certification because it seeks to represent a one-employee unit, the Board's position has been
that the picketing is not prohibited by § 8(b)(7)(C) and may therefore continue even though
a filed petition would be immediately dismissed. See American Radio Ass'n. (Watters Marine,
Inc.), 258 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1981); Teamsters, Local 115 (Vila-Barr Co.), 157 N.L.R.B. 588 (1966).
On the other hand, the Board has held that any picketing would violate § 8(b)(7)(C) when
a union cannot be certified because it seeks to represent a unit of guards but admits nonguards as union members. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
88. See Local 282, Teamsters, 262 N.L.R.B. 528 (1982); General Serv. Employees, Local
73 (A-I Sec. Serv.), 224 N.L.R.B. 434 (1976), enforced, 578 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Teamsters, Local 71 (Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp), 221 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1975), enforced,
553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Drivers, Local 639 (Dunbar Armored Express, Inc.), 211
N.L.R.B. 687 (1974).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976).
90. 221 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1975), enforced, 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
91. Id. at 1242. Member Fanning strongly dissented. In his view, "[t]he election required
by Section 8(b)(7)(C) needs no certifiable petitioner to raise a question concerning representation." Id. at 1240 (dissenting opinion). Rather, the Board should conduct the expedited
election envisioned by the section and certify the arithmetical results since it cannot certify
the union. The union's picketing would be barred for one year if it lacked majority support.
Id. at 1240-41 (dissenting opinion).
92. Id. at 1240.
93. 224 N.L.R.B. 434 (1976), enforced, 578 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976).
95. 224 N.L.R.B. at 436.
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picket for recognition or take advantage of the up to thirty day 'grace period'
provided in 8(b)(7)(C) for recognitional picketing."9 (
Employer unfair labor practices are not an automatic defense to a charge
of a section 8(b)(7) violation. 97 Nonetheless, employer unfair labor practices
which prompt a union's picketing for recognition or organizational purposes
are not completely irrelevant under section 8(b)(7). Section 8(b)(7)(A) bans
picketing where the employer "has lawfully recognized in accordance with this
Act any other labor organization.9'g Under section 8(b)(7)(A), the picketing
union can defeat an unfair labor practice charge by proving that the incumbent union had been supported by the employer in violation of section
Furthermore, section 8(b)(7)(C) makes the right to continue picketing
beyond a reasonable period of time contingent upon a prompt determination
of the representation question in a Board election. The election must be valid
under Board standards for the election results to have meaning.100 A valid
election cannot be conducted when current, unremedied employer unfair
labor practices might affect employee free choice. Curtailing the union's
right to continue picketing based on the results of such an election could encourage the employer to commit unfair labor practices to assure the union's
defeat.
In International Hod Carriers, Local 840 (C.A. Blinne Construction
Co.),1' 1 the Board analyzed the effect of employer unfair labor practices on a
union's section 8(b)(7)(C) obligation to file a representation petition as a prelude to an expedited election when picketing for longer than thirty days. The
union argued that when an employer commits unfair labor practices the
Board should waive the filing requirement because the resulting expedited
election would be tainted by unfair labor practices. Holding that unfair labor
practice charges did not relieve the union of its obligation to file a representation petition, 10 2 the Board found the union's fears groundlesso3 If the unfair
96. General Serv. Employees, Local 73 v. NLRB, 578 F2d 361, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
97. See International Hod Carriers, Local 840 (C.A. Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B.
1153, 1165-67 (1962). In fact, Congress specifically rejected a proposal which would have had
that effect. Id. at 1163.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A) (1976).
99. The proviso to § 10(1) emphasizes this by providing that a temporary injunction
shall not be sought where an investigated and meritorious 8(b)(2) charge has been filed. 29

U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
100. Section 8(b)(7)(B) emphasizes this by barring picketing within twelve months of
"a valid election under section [9(C)]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976).
101. 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).

102. Id. at 1165.
103. Id. at 1166. The Board stated:
In our view, Congress intended that, except to the limited extent set forth in the
limited proviso, the Board in section 8(b)(7)(C) cases follow the tried and familiar
procedures it typically follows in representation cases where unfair labor practice
charges are filed. That procedure .. .is to hold the representation case in abeyance
and refrain from holding an election pending the resolution of the unfair labor
practice charges.
Id. at 1165.
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practice charges were meritorious, the expedited election would be delayed
until an uncoerced election could be held. On the other hand, if the charge
of employer unfair labor practices were found baseless, an expedited election
10 4
would quickly follow in accordance with Congress' direction.
The Board concluded that unless a representation petition is filed within
a reasonable period of time, the picketing will violate subsection (C) notwithstanding the employer's unfair labor practices. Even if a timely petition is filed,
it nonetheless may be "blocked" by the employer's unfair labor practices. If
the union files charges concerning the employer's conduct and the Board
determines the charges have merit, no election would be held on the petition
until the unfair labor practices were remedied. The union could continue
picketing in the interim, but. steps to check the picketing could not be taken
under 8(b)(7)(B) until the union lost in a valid election.
InformationalPicketingException
Subsection 8(b)(7)(C) proscribes picketing for recognition or organization
when a petition for an election has not been filed within a reasonable time
from the commencement of picketing.' °5 The second proviso to section
8(b)(7)(C) carves out a significant exception to this general ban on recognition
and organizational picketing. The proviso allows picketing for recognition or
organization under two specified conditions. First, the picketing must be for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public that the picketed employer "does not
employ members of, or have a contract with a labor organization."10 6 Under the
second condition, the picketing cannot interfere with deliveries to or the performance of other services at the picketed premises by employees of other employers.
The Board's focus in determining whether the picketing causes delivery
interruptions or work stoppages at the picketed premises is on the actual impact
upon the employer's business. 07 The question, in the Board's view, is "whether
the picketing has disrupted, interfered with, or curtailed the employer's
business."' ° 1 The proviso's protection is lost only if the picketing results in
numerous delivery stoppages1 9 or compels the employer to modify his normal
dealings with suppliers. 10 Picketing for other purposes is not within the ambit
of section 8(b)(7) and thus is not proscribed by the second proviso even when
it causes delivery stoppage. Furthermore, the proviso does not exempt picketing that is otherwise banned by subsections (A) and (B).
The second proviso essentially reflects a congressional compromise sanctioning "publicity picketing" and prohibiting "signal picketing.""' Publicity picket104. Id. at 1166.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
106. Id.
107. Retail Clerks, Locals 324 & 770 (Barker Bros. Corp. & Gold's, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B.
478 (1962), rev. denied, 328 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1964).
108. Id. at 491.
109. Id. at 478.
110. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 203 N.L.R.B. 744 (1973).
111. This difference between "publicity picketing" and "signal picketing" was aptly
described by Professor Archibald Cox:
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ing seeks to enlist the consuming public's support for the picket's cause. 12
Signal picketing, on the other hand, is primarily intended to inform union
members that their unions are invoking organized economic action against the
picketed employer. "13 As noted by the Second Circuit, "[t]his proviso gives the
union freedom to appeal to the unorganized public for spontaneous popular
pressure upon an employer; it is intended, however, to exclude the invocation
of pressure by organized labor groups or members of unions, as such.""14
APPRAISAL OF T=E STATUTE:

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIODEATIONS

Recognitional or organizational picketing has been virtually prohibited by
section 8(b)(7) as the preceding discussion indicates. Picketing which is not
subject to prohibition is severely limited in duration. Only an innocuous
form of informational picketing is seemingly preserved, and even that protection is forfeited where adverse effects occur. Section 8(b)(7) thus goes "beyond
the Taft-Hartley Act to legislate a comprehensive code governing" recognitional
and organizational picketing."15
Such a sweeping governmental prohibition of peaceful picketing raises
questions"16 of unconstitutional abridgement of first amendment rights of
freedom of speech and assembly."17 It may be too late in the decisional day,
however, for such questions to be considered seriously. At one time the Supreme Court broadly assimilated peaceful picketing into the freedom of
speech and assembly protected under the fourteenth amendment." 38
This distinction between picketing backed by the threat of economic punishment and
picketing which appeals only to reason, loyalty and other emotions is paralleled by
a difference in the audience which the pickets seek to reach. The Teamsters' picket
line is rarely addressed to individual members of the public. Its primary, and often its
exclusive purpose is to notify union members and members of affiliated unions that
they must not work in the picketed establishment, or pick up or deliver goods, because their unions are engaged in bringing economic weapons to bear on the employer. Despite its element of publicity and propaganda, therefore, such picketing
may be fairly described as the signal by which the union invokes its economic power.
The pickets patrolling in front of a retail establishment are also bringing economic
pressure against the business - and in this respect the case is the same - but their
appeal is addressed to the public and the members of the public decide chiefly as
individuals whether to patronize the establishment or to support the pickets' cause.
Thus the publicizing is the primary element and the disciplined economic power of
the union is an insignificant factor.
Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574, 594-95 (1951).
112. Cox, supra note 111, at 595-97.
113. Id. at 595-96. See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 262-70 (1959).
114. NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, 317 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 1963).
115. NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 291 (1960). See also NLRB v. Local 103,
Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
116. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 265, IBEW (RP & M Elec.), 604 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, 339 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Local Joint Bd. v.
Sperry, 323 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1963); Dayton Typographical Union v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 634
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
117. U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
118. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US. 88 (1940). The Court struck down a blanket ban
against all peaceful picketing and stated:
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In later years the Court retreated from this broad equation with the development of the unlawful purpose doctrine. The Court found that picketing
encompassed more than the communication of ideas."19 While picketing had
publicity aspects, it was also a signal to organized labor for economic action.
The act of picketing was more likely to induce action than the message conveyed. 120 The signal aspects therefore justified curtailment of picketing which
contravened legitimate governmental purposes.
The Court thus upheld state injunctions against picketing when the
manner or object of the picketing was contrary to a valid state policy. 121 Moreover, the Court held that Congress similarly had the power to regulate and
curtail peaceful picketing.12 ' Given this federal and state power to curtail
picketing that contravenes legitimate governmental purposes, first amendIn the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
Free discussion concerning the conditions in inguaranteed by the constitution ....
dustry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective
and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of
modern industrial society.
Id. at 102-03. See also Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)
the Court stated: "The right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning, the adlantages
and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as part of free speech,
but as part of free assembly." Id. at 532.
Cases such as Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and Chauffeurs, Local 795 v.
Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958), involved legislative or injunctive bans drawn in "sweeping and
inexact terms." Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112 (1940). These bans prohibited all
peaceful picketing irrespective of the legitimacy of the object.
119. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). "[V]hile picketing is a mode of
communication, it is inseparably something more and different." Id. at 464. See also Bakery
Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) (Douglas. J., concurring). "Picketing by an
organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and
since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being di-seminated." Id. at 776.
120. Building Serv. Employees, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950). See also
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968): "This Court has held that when 'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms."
121. See Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing to compel the employer
to force his employees to join the union); Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers &
Steamfitters v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (picketing to compel an "all union" job);
Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (picketing to compel self-employed persons to
adhere to a union limitation on business hours); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460
(1950) (picketing to compel retail stores to hire a certain proportion of Negroes); Building
Serv. Employees, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (picketing to compel the employer
to force his employees to accept the union as their representative); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (picketing to compel a violation of the state antitrust
law).
122. Local 501, Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (secondary boycott
picketing). See also ILA v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982) (secondary boycott
picketing); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (secondary boycott picketing).
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ment challenges to section 8(b)(7) have been uniformly unsuccessful. 23 In upholding the constitutionality of the section, courts have relied upon the unlawful purpose doctrine,124 the Act's safeguards protecting "pure" free speech,12
1 26
and the section's lack of oppression in its practical impact.
One legitimate governmental purpose which, if contravened, justifies curtailing picketing is ensuring employee freedom of choice in selecting a bargaining representative. Section 8(b)(7) implements this policy by channeling representation questions into the NLRB election processes and away from the
recognitional and organizational pressures of the picket line.127 While the
representational question is pending, the right to continue recognition or
organization picketing may be preserved despite any signal effects of the
picketing. The right to engage in publicity (informational) non-effects picketing is also clearly preserved in this period, as well as in other non-(A) or (B)
situations. In this regard, then, a balance between a legitimate governmental
purpose and free speech is made.
Section 8(b)(7) further implements the governmental policy of securing employee free choice by insulating that choice from picketing pressures once the
selection is made. Thus, sections 8(b)(7)(A) and (B) provide for periods of
absolute repose following election or contract execution. During these periods
both signal recognition or organization picketing and publicity recognition or
organization picketing is banned. In these situations the constitutional balance
is less even.
Even during the (A) and (B) periods of repose, however, the union remains
free to engage in nonrecognition or organization publicity picketing. For
example, the union may engage in area standards picketing. Free speech
rights are somewhat preserved when the union's interest is in publicizing an
employer's noncompliance with union economic standards. Free speech rights
are limited, however, when the union's interest is in publicizing the employer's
non-union or other union status.
Because the union may disseminate information in (A) and (B) periods
through means other than picketing suggests that its first amendment rights
are preserved to some extent. The right to engage in publicity other than
picketing, however, may be so meaningless a form of communication as to be
123. NLRB v. IBEW, Local 265 (PR & M Elec.), 604 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1979); NLR.B
v. Local 3, IBEW, 339 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Dayton Typographical Union v.
NLRB, 326 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Local Joint Bd. v. Sperry, 323 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1963).
See also Service Employees, Local 399, 263 N.L.R.B. 153 (1982) (Board declined to address
first amendment issue in unfair labor practice proceeding under § 8(b)(4)).
124. NLRB v. IBEW, Local 265 (RP & M Elec.), 604 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1979); Dayton
Typographical Union v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Local Joint Bd. v. Sperry,
323 F.2d 75, 79 (8th Cir. 1963).
125. Local Joint Bd. v. Sperry, 323 F.2d 75, 79 (8th Cir. 1963).
126. Dayton Typographical Union v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In the
court's view the statutory expedited election petition procedure provides the union a course
of action by which it legally could picket. Id. at 649.
127. The section represents a comprehensive code designed by Congress to further the
orderly resolution of disputes by requiring such questions to be settled through Board
processes rather than as a result of coercive pickcting. NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S.
274,291 (1960).
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no right at all. This is especially so where such conduct as handbilling and
stationary signs is deemed picketing under 8(b)(7).
Arguably, the constitutional balance in (A) and (B) situations is restored
when the employer's interests are added to the governmental side of the scale.
The dispositive question is whether Congress has a legitimate governmental
purpose in insulating employers not only from all signal and effects-publicity
(informational) recognition in (A) and (B) situations, but also from all such
non-effects publicity picketing.
From the standpoint of both private and public interests, Congress clearly
has a legitimate purpose in protecting the employer against certain coercive
picketing. Property and industrial peace considerations are particularly significant. Such purpose certainly justifies the employer protections accorded in
(C) situations when signal picketing is limited to a reasonable period not to
exceed thirty days, or to a confined, expedited election period. Beyond that,
effects-recognition or organization publicity picketing is proscribed. Non-effects
publicity picketing may continue indefinitely, however, until it is subsumed
in (A) or (B) situations. The governmental purpose of protecting employers
against certain picketing also justifies a ban on signal or effects-publicity
picketing in (A) and (B) situations.
Absent coercive pressures there is no legitimately vindicatable employer
interest that justifies the ban on non-effects publicity picketing. Employer
reassertion of the employee free choice rights previously discussed does not
magnify the weight already accorded those separate rights. Consideration of
employer interests on the government's side thus fails to repair the constitutional imbalance suggested in (A) and (B) situations.
In short, it is doubtful that legitimate governmental purposes warrant the
prohibitions of (A) and (B) against non-effects publicity picketing. Absent
signal harm, the mere existence of a recognitional or organizational object
would not seem to predominate over the speech elements. A distinction should
be made between information, non-effects recognition or organization picketing, and signal or informational effects recognition or organization picketing.
Implicit in this distinction is the proposition that informational, non-effects
picketing is not intended to force immediate recognition during a period
when such object cannot lawfully be granted.
This distinction surfaced some years ago in Hughes v. Superior Court.128
In that case a group of pickets peacefully patrolled a store to compel the employer (Lucky) to hire Negro clerks on a proportional basis in relation to the
number of Negro customers. The picket signs read: "Lucky Won't Hire
Negro Clerks in Proportion to Negro Trade- Don't Patronize." The pickets
did not prevent customers or employees of Lucky from going to and from the
store. The picketing was unaccompanied by threats, misrepresentation, or
intimidation. In addition, there was no finding that the picketing in any way
affected Lucky's business. The California Supreme Court nonetheless found
the picketing's objective contrary to declared state policy against discrimination
in hiring and upheld an injunction against the picketing.129 Dissenting Justice
128.
129.

339 U.S. 460 (1950).
Hughes v. Superior Court. 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948).
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Traynor believed the injunction was unconstitutional since the picketing did
not possess "signal" aspects. 30 The United States Supreme Court held that the
picketing was validly enjoined, stating "[t]he Constitution does not demand
that the element of communication in picketing prevail over the mischief
furthered by its use in these situations [to compel employment on the basis of

racial grounds]." 131.
Hughes thus indicates that peaceful picketing in furtherance of an illegal
objective may be constitutionally interdicted even though it is not a "signal"
32
to employee action, but is merely an appeal to consumers not to patronize.
Hughes also suggests that the legislature may prohibit even picketing which is
"pure speech" if "the gravity of the evil the legislature seeks to prevent, discounted by its improbability, justifies the infringement."'3 3 This test was met
in Hughes by the state's nondiscrimination policy. Hughes does not dearly
reject the suggestion that informational, non-effects picketing intended solely
to inform or protest, rather than to further an unlawful objective, may not
constitutionally be proscribed. 3
Thus, in Hughes, the California Supreme Court noted a distinction between
130. Id. at 871, 198 P.2d 897.
131. 339 U.S. at 464. The Court stated:
But while picketing is a mode of communication, it is inseparably something more
and different. Industrial picketing "is more than free speech, since it involves patrol
of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action
of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disseminated". . . . Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars,
may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a
picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces
consequences, different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by
printed word.
Id. at 464-65. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, "picketing, not being the equivalent
of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent. Picketing is not beyond
the control of a State if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which
it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance." Id. at 465-66.
132. Professor Gregory once observed:
What difference is there between the sympathetic cooperation of the public, on the
one hand, and of workers, on the other? ... All picketing is obviously conducted to
coerce. The desired coercion is achieved through convincing customers not to enter,
by persuading loyal employees to withdraw, by influencing job hunters to remain
away, and by enlisting the aid of all other union folk with a prejudice against crossing
picket lines. I do not suggest that peaceful picketing coerces those whose aid is requested. But I doubt if much support is won on intellectual conviction as to the
merits of the cause. Most of it is probably induced by a combination of fear, prudence
and social embarrassment - a sort of psychological coercion which compounds itself
ultimately into economic coercion on the picketing business.
Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct,
49 MicH. L. Ray. 191, 207 (1950).
133. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits) v. NLRB, 308
F.2d 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
134. Indeed, absent the element of affirmative furtherance of an independent, unlawful
objective, it would seem that even consumer picketing is permissible.
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picketing to promote and picketing against discrimination. The court observed that "[i]t may be assumed for the purposes of this decision, without
deciding, that if such discrimination exists, picketing to protest it would not be
for an unlawful objective."' 13- The Supreme Court simply commented that "we
cannot construe the Due Process Clause as precluding California from securing
respect for its policy against involuntary employment on racial lines by prohibiting systematic picketing that would subvert such policy."'13 6
Further support for the proposition that nonsignal, non-effects picketing
constitutionally may not be proscribed is found in Fruit & Vegetable Packers
6 Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits) v. NLRB. 137 The D.C. Circuit
avoided a perceived serious constitutional question by construing the secondary
boycott prohibitions of section 8(b)(4) to bar consumer picketing only where
such picketing in fact had a coercive effect upon the neutral employer.
The court distinguished picketing addressed to union member employees-35
from picketing merely addressed to members of the public. Congress may
constitutionally regulate the former because it is a signal to action. Such
picketing makes an appeal to individuals who are "subject to group discipline
based on common interests and loyalties, habit, fear of social ostracism, or the
application of severe economic sanction." 139 Picketing which appeals to the
public, however, has no such signal effect and is "closer to the core notion of
constitutionally protected free speech."' 4 0 Without a specific showing that
such picketing has imposed economic injury, banning it may violate the first
amendment. As Judge Bazelon stated:
It is true that even if picketing is in a given case "pure speech," this does
not bar Congress or the states from prohibiting such appeals in all
circumstances .... But in the absence of a showing that a substantial
economic impact on the secondary employer has occurred or is likely
to occur, we would be hard-put to find a constitutional justification for
prohibiting a union from using picketing as the form of making "do
not patronize" appeals, so long as the picketing is conducted in an
entirely peaceful and non-coercive manner, is addressed solely to consumers, and has no side effects which might
be a basis for distinguishing it from any other form of publicity.141
Applying a different statutory analysis from the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme
Court held the statute does not prohibit limited product picketing which is
confined to persuading customers to cease buying the primary employer's
product.142 The Court noted that Congress has consistently refused to prohibit
peaceful picketing except where it is used as a means to achieve specific ends
135. 32 Cal. 2d at 855, 198 P.2d at 888.
136. 339 U.S. at 466.
137. 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962), rev'd on nonconstitutional grounds sub nom, NLRB
v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
138. E.g., Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
139. 308 F.2d at 316.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 317.
142. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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which experience has shown are "undesirable".143 The Court concluded that
the statute's legislative history does not clearly reflect a congressional intent to
m 44
ban all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites.
Policy Considerations
Aside from questions of constitutionally protected speech, the emergent
sweeping regulatory scheme of section 8(b)(7) necessarily raises additional
questions of fundamental policy. By enacting the statute, Congress was obviously concerned with limiting industrial unrest and avoiding obstructions to
interstate commerce. Congress was also concerned with the legitimate interests
of the public, employees, employers and unions. Viewed against these divergent and often conflicting interests, the congressional balance appears expedient. The essential fairness of the balance is somewhat debatable.
National labor policy, as embodied in the Act, recognizes employees' rights
of self-organization and representation, including the concomitant right to receive all information relevant to an informed choice. That policy also
recognizes a union's organizational and recognitional rights, including the
right to disseminate information to employees. Section 8(b)(7) does not intrude
where the foregoing rights are exercised by means other than picketing. Where
such rights are exercised by picketing, however, severe limitations are imposed.
Thus, proscribed object picketing, informational or otherwise, is completely
forbidden in (A) contract situations which may include periods of several
years, and in (B) election situations which include at least one year. Proscribed
object picketing, other than non-effects informational picketing, is severely
limited in (C) situations, generally to either thirty days or the slightly longer
expedited election period. The circle is completed by (A) or (B) situations
arising to defeat even the limited informational picketing otherwise permitted
by (C).
As discussed earlier, compelling employer, public and sometimes employee
143. Id. at 62.
144. Id. at 63. "All that the legislative history shows in the way of an 'isolated evil' believed to require proscription of peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites was its use
to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order
to force him to cease trading with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer." Id.
In the Court's view, there was considerable difference between such conduct and peaceful
picketing at the secondary site directed only at the struck product. Id.
Thereafter, in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980),
the Court held that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act proscribed secondary picketing against a
struck product where the picketing predictably encourages consumers to boycott the
neutral party's business altogether. Id. at 614-15. The Court further held such a proscription
consistent with the free speech guarantees of the first amendment. Id. at 616. Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, in separate concurrences, complained that Justice Powell's majority
opinion was too cursory in its discussion of the first amendment issue. Id. at 616-18. Each,
however, found the restriction on picketing here to be constitutional; Justice Blackmun on the
ground that the government's interest in protecting neutrals from coerced participation in the
strike vras sufficiently strong, id. at 617-18, and Justice Stevens on the ground that picketing
has strong elements of conduct and is therefore not entitled to the same protections as
pure speech. Id. at 618-19. Justice Brennan's dissent did not address the first amendment
issue.
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interests justify prohibiting coercive or signal picketing for prolonged periods.
Justifying the preclusion of noncoercive picketing is more problematic, particularly if picketing is viewed as the only viable method of labor communication. Absent disruption, ongoing organizational efforts by means of picketing
seem tolerable.
The fact that the employees have elected either to forego representation
or have selected another union, does not require maintaining a sterile environment. The union may have a legitimate interest in disseminating information regarding the nonunion or other union status and the employees
may have interests in receiving that information. The Supreme Court has
clearly recognized, for example, the significant and protected interests of
employees desiring to supplant the incumbent union with another representative.14
Even the limited open season situations under (C) raise questions of
policy and fairness because they are severely curtailed by the thirty day and
expedited election limitations. The thirty day limitation represents an empiric
judgment which may be valid despite its arbitrariness. It may be a fair assumption that thirty days of signal picketing will determine the outcome of
the union's organizational effort. Assuming, therefore, the fairness of the
trial period, the fairness of the expedited election arguably follows.
In effect, the predicate for a valid expedited election process is the
assumption that the Act works fairly. Thus the union will not be propelled
into an election in the face of unremedied charges of unfair labor practices.
Similarly, a picketing union lawfully entitled to recognition will be permitted
to continue picketing, theoretically even after a bargaining order issues from
an unfair labor practice proceeding.146 These assurances, however, rest essentially upon the presumption of administrative regularity. The General
Counsel has plenary authority respecting the issuance of unfair labor practice
complaints. 4 7 Remedial avoidance of an expedited election, or pursuit of the
union's charges, depends upon the General Counsel's informal discretion.
This process allows neither hearing nor review. If one regards such discretionary justice as fair, the union is not prejudiced. To the extent the
picketing union relies upon and is bound by the General Counsel's determina8
tion, the union is no different from any other charging party under the Act.14
CONCLUSION

The Board and courts have defined and clarified the contours of section
8(b)(7) since its enactment twenty-five years ago. The essential interpretive
questions concerning the section's meaning and application have been resolved.
145. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., '-15 U.S. 322 (1974).
146. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 US. 575 (1969); Dayton Typographical Union,
Local No. 57 v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
147. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d
214 (lst Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972), and cases cited therein.
148, In the (B) situation the union could at least in theory challenge the invalidity of
the election by way of objections despite the employer's unremedied unfair labor practices.
See Dayton Typographical Union, Local 57 v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1963); NLRB v.
Local 182, IBT, 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
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The section appears today in equipoise. Having said that, however, it may be
appropriate to recall the words of Justice Cardozo: "We like to picture to
ourselves the field of law as accurately mapped and plotted. We draw out little
1 49
lines and they are hardly drawn before we blur them."
149. B. CAwozo, Ti

NATuRE oF THE JuDicuL PROCESS 161 (1921).
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